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Abstract. The literature on information flow security with respect to
transitive policies has been concentrated largely on the case of policies
with two security domains, High and Low, because of a presumption
that more general policies can be reduced to this two-domain case. The
details of the reduction have not been the subject of careful study, how-
ever. Many works in the literature use a reduction based on a quantifi-
cation over “Low-down” partitionings of domains into those below and
those not below a given domain in the information flow order. A few
use “High-up” partitionings of domains into those above and those not
above a given domain. Our paper argues that more general “cut” parti-
tionings are also appropriate, and studies the relationships between the
resulting multi-domain notions of security when the basic notion for the
two-domain case to which we reduce is either Nondeducibility on Inputs
or Generalized Noninterference. The Low-down reduction is shown to be
weaker than the others, and while the High-up reduction is sometimes
equivalent to the cut reduction, both it and the Low-down reduction
may have an undesirable property of non-monotonicity with respect to
a natural ordering on policies. These results suggest that the cut-based
partitioning yields a more robust general approach for reduction to the
two-domain case.
Keywords: Noninterference, nondeterminism, information flow, covert
channels, policies
1 Introduction
Information flow security is concerned with finding, preventing and understand-
ing the unwanted flow of information within a system implementation. One of its
applications is the detection of covert channels, which might arise due to hard-
to-foresee side-effects in the combination of smaller components, or even have
been deliberately planted in the implementation by a rogue systems designer.
In order to reason about information flow, one needs to decompose the sys-
tem into information domains. Domains are thought of as active components
(users, processes, pieces of hardware, organisational units, etc.) and change the
system state by performing actions. Domains may also make observations of the
system state. One way for information to flow from one domain to another is for
the actions of the first to change the observations of the second. To describe the
allowed flows of information in the system, one can specify for each pair of do-
mains in which directions a flow of information is permissible. This specification
is called a policy and usually represented as a directed graph: two examples are
depicted in Figure 1. Policies are generally taken to be reflexive relations, since
nothing can prevent a domain from obtaining information about itself. More-
over, they are often assumed to be transitive, (i.e., if A 7→ B and B 7→ C then
we must also have A 7→ C) since if B may obtain information about A, and B
may pass this information to C, then there is nothing to prevent C receiving
information about A. 3
(a) L H (b) U
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Fig. 1. The two-level policy H 67→ L and a transitive MLS-style policy.
Policy (a) in Figure 1, which we call H 67→ L, is the simplest and most-
studied case. Here we have two domains H and L, where H is thought to possess
high and L low level clearance in the system, and information flow is permitted
from L to H , but prohibited in the other direction. In practice, a larger set of
domains is used to represent different security classifications, such as Unclassified
(U), Confidential (C), Secret (S) and Top Secret (TS), and each security level
may moreover be partitioned into compartments representing different types of
information relevant to ‘need to know’ restrictions. This leads to policies such as
the transitive policy whose Hasse diagram is depicted in Figure 1(b). Here the
Confidential classification has two independent compartment domains (C1, C2),
as does the Secret classification (S1, S2).
Informally, the statement u 7→ v can be read as “u’s behaviour may influence
v’s observations” or “v may deduce something about u’s behaviour”. A first for-
mal definition for this intuition, called noninterference was given by Goguen and
Meseguer [4], in the context of a deterministic automaton-based model. A gener-
alization to nondeterministic systems is desirable so one can extend information
flow analysis to, for example, the use of unreliable components, randomness or
underspecification. Several works (e.g., [5,6,7,8,9,10,11]) extended the theory to
nondeterministic systems and richer semantic models such as process algebras,
resulting in a multitude of security definitions for several kinds of models, and
with different intentions in mind.
Much of this subsequent literature has confined itself to the two-domain
policy H 67→ L, because there has been a view that more complex policies can be
treated by reduction to this case. One obvious way to do so, that we may call
3 We confine our attention in this paper to the transitive case. Works that have inves-
tigated intransitive information flow theory include [1], [2] and [3].
the pointwise approach, is to apply a two-domain notion of noninterference for
each pair of domains u, v in the policy with u 67→ v. However, even in the case
of deterministic systems, this can be shown to fail to detect situations where a
domain may have disjunctive knowledge about a pair of other domains, neither
of which may interfere with it individually (we present an example of this in
Section 4). Goguen and Meseguer [4] already address this deficiency by what we
may call a setwise approach, which requires that for each domain u, the set of
domains v with v 67→ u does not collectively interfere with u.
However, while the setwise definition deals with what an individual domain
may learn about a group of other domains, it does not deal with what groups
may learn about individuals, or other groups. Subsequent work in the literature
has taken this issue of collusion into account in reducing to the two-domain case.
For example, a survey by Ryan [11] states:
It might seem that we have lost generality by assuming that the alphabet
of the system is partitioned into High and Low. In fact we can deal
with more general MLS-style policy with a lattice of classifications by
a set of non-interference constraints corresponding to the various lattice
points. For each lattice point l we define High to be the union of the
interfaces of agents whose clearance dominates that of l. Low will be the
complement, i.e., the union of the interfaces of all agents whose clearance
does not dominate that of l. Notice also that we are assuming that we
can clump all the high-level users together and similarly all the low-level
users. There is nothing to stop all the low users from colluding. Similarly
any high-level user potentially has access to the inputs of all other high
users. We are thus again making a worst-case assumption.
We call the kind of groupings that Ryan describes High-up coalitions, and in-
terpret his comments as the suggestion to extend existing, already understood
security definitions for H 67→ L to the multi-domain case by generating multiple
instances of H 67→ L formed from the policy in question using High-up coalitions.
Ryan’s High-up approach is used in some works (e.g., [12]), but many others
(e.g., [13,14,15,16]) use instead a dual notion of Low-down coalitions, where for
some domain l, the group L is taken to be the set of domains u with u 7→ l and
H is taken to be the complement of this set.
Yet other groupings exist that are neither High-up nor Low-down coali-
tions. For example, in Figure 1(b), the grouping L = {U,C1, C2} and H =
{S1, S2, TS}, corresponds to neither a High-up nor a Low-down coalition. It
seems no less reasonable to consider L to be a colluding group that is seeking
to obtain H level information. Note that this grouping is a cut in the sense that
there is no u ∈ H and v ∈ L such that u 7→ v. Since in such a cut, domains in
L cannot individually obtain information about domains in H , it is reasonable
to expect that they should not be able to get such information collectively. This
motivates a reduction to the two-domain case that quantifies over all cuts.
Our contribution in this paper is to consider this range of alternative re-
ductions from multi-domain policies to the two-domain case, and to develop an
understanding of how these definitions are related and which are reasonable.
Reductions must start with an existing notion of security for the two-domain
case. We work with two basic security definitions: Generalized Noninterference,
which was introduced in [17], and Nondeducibility on Inputs, first presented in
[5]. Our analysis shows that the relationships between the resulting notions of
security are subtle, and the adequacy of a reduction approach may depend on
the base notion for the two-domain policy. Amongst other results, we show that:
1. When the basic notion for the two-domain case is Generalized Noninter-
ference, High-up coalitions yield a notion that is strictly stronger than the
notion based on Low-down coalitions, which in turn is stronger than the
pointwise generalization. For Nondeducibility on Inputs, however, High-up
coalitions and Low-down coalitions give independent notions of security.
Low-down coalitions imply the setwise definition in this case, but High-up
coalitions imply only the weaker pointwise version.
2. For Generalized Noninterference, High-up coalitions are ‘complete’ in the
sense of being equivalent to a reduction quantifying over all cuts. However,
this completeness result does not hold for Nondeducibility on Inputs, where
cuts yield a stronger notion of security.
3. Not all the resulting notions of security have an expected property of mono-
tonicity with respect to a natural restrictiveness order on policies. (Security
of a system should be preserved when one relaxes policy constraints.) In par-
ticular, High-up coalitions with respect to Nondeducibility on Inputs does
not have this property, and Low-down coalitions do not have this property
for either Generalized Noninterference or Nondeducibility on Inputs.
These conclusions indicate that while Ryan’s proposal to use High-up coalitions
is sometimes adequate, a reduction that quantifies over the larger set of all cut
coalitions seems to yield the most generally robust approach for reducing multi-
domain policies to the two-domain case.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model
and show how systems and policies are described. Our reductions will use two ba-
sic security definitions for two-domain policies that are recalled and generalized
to their obvious pointwise versions for the multi-domain case in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 gives some examples showing why the pointwise versions are still weaker
than required, and it is necessary to consider reductions using groupings of do-
mains. The range of reductions we consider are defined in Section 5. Our main
results are stated in Section 6, full proofs of which are given in Section 7. Finally,
we conclude and motivate further research in Section 8.
2 Background: Systems and Policy Model
Notational conventions. Sequences are represented as xyz, or x · y · z if it helps
readability. The set of finite sequences over a set A is denoted A∗, and the empty
sequence is denoted ε. The length of α is written as |α|. We write α(i) to denote
the element with index i of a sequence α, where i ∈ N, and the first element of
α is α(0). We let last(α) be the last element of α if α is non-empty, and let it be
undefined if α is empty. If X ⊆ A and α ∈ A∗ then let α|X be the subsequence
of α with only elements from X retained. The set of total functions from A to
B is denoted BA.
Systems. We use an automaton-based model similar to the original Goguen-
Meseguer one from [4]. A system is a structure (S,A,O,D,∆, obs, dom, sI) with
S a set of states, A a finite set of actions, D a finite set of domains with at
least two members, O a finite set of observations such that A and O are dis-
joint, ∆ ⊆ S×A×S a (nondeterministic) transition relation, obs : D×S → O an
observation function, dom: A → D an assignment of actions to domains, and
sI the initial state. We write obsu(s) for obs(u, s). The value obsu(s) represents
the observation the domain u makes when the system is in state s. Observations
can also be interpreted as outputs from the system. For an action a, the domain
dom(a) is the domain from which a originates. The relation∆ is called determin-
istic if for all s, s′, s′′ ∈ S, a ∈ A: if (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆ and (s, a, s′′) ∈ ∆ then s′ = s′′.
We assume systems to be input-enabled, i.e. that for every s ∈ S and a ∈ A there
is s′ ∈ S with (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆. The assumption of input-enabledness is made to
guarantee that the domains’ reasoning is based on their actions and observations
only and cannot use system blocking behaviour as a source of information.
A run of a system is a sequence s0a1s1 . . . ansn ∈ S(AS)∗ such that for i < n,
we have (si, ai, si+1) ∈ ∆. It is initial if s0 = sI . If not explicitly mentioned
otherwise, we always assume initial runs. The set of initial runs of a system
M will be denoted Runs(M). For a run r, the subsequence of actions of r
is denoted act(r) and the subsequence of actions performed by a domain u is
denoted actu(r).
Notational and diagrammatic conventions for systems. If u is a domain and A
the action set of a system, we write Au for the set of actions a with dom(a) = u.
Similarly, for X a set of domains we write AX for the set of actions a with
dom(a) ∈ X . Systems are depicted as directed graphs, where the vertices contain
the state names. Domain observations are written near the vertices that represent
the states. Edges are labelled with action names and represent transitions from
one state to another. The initial state is marked with an arrow that points to
it. Self-looping edges are omitted when possible to reduce clutter: thus, the lack
of an edge labelled by action a from state s (as would be required by input-
enabledness) implies the existence of edge (s, a, s).
Modelling information by views. We will be interested in an asynchronous se-
mantics for information, and capture asynchrony by treating sequences that
differ only by stuttering observations as indistinguishable. This can also be de-
scribed as no domain having access to a global clock. Intuitively, systems can
be imagined as distributed and domains as representing network hosts. From
this intuition it follows, for a given domain u, that local state changes within
domains distinct from u that do not provide a new observation to u must not
generate a copy of u’s current observation. To this end, we use an ‘absorptive
concatenation’ operator ◦ˆ on sequences. For all sequences α and b0 . . . bn we let
α ◦ˆ ε = α and
α ◦ˆ b0 . . . bn =
{
α ◦ˆ b1 . . . bn if α 6= ε and last(α) = b0
(α · b0) ◦ˆ b1 . . . bn otherwise.
One can imagine α ◦ˆβ as α·β with stuttering at the point of connection removed.
The information a domain acquires over the course of a run is modelled by the
notion of view. Considering systems as networks suggests that, during a run, a
domain can only directly see the actions performed by itself. This is reflected in
our definition of view by eliminating actions performed by all other domains. For
a domain u the operator viewu : Runs(M) → (A ∪ O)∗ is defined inductively:
for the base case r = sI let viewu(r) = obsu(sI). For all r ∈ Runs(M) of the
form r = r′as, where r′ ∈ Runs(M), a ∈ A and s ∈ S, let
viewu(r) =
{
viewu(r
′) · a · obsu(s) if dom(a) = u
viewu(r
′) ◦ˆ obsu(s) otherwise.
An element viewu(r) is called a u view. The set of all u views in system M is
denoted Viewsu(M).
For an example of a view, see the system in Figure 2 (recall that we elide
self-loops) and consider the run r = sIas1bs2bs2as3; the domains are given by
the set {A,B}, the domain assignment is given by dom(a) = A and dom(b) = B,
and the observations made by domain B are depicted near the state names. We
have viewB(r) = ⊥b1b12.
sI
s1
s0
s2 s3
⊥ 0
⊥ 1 2
b
a
b a
Fig. 2. System example.
Note that B does not notice the first transi-
tion in r because we have obsB(sI) = obsB(s1).
Domain B does, however, learn about the last
transition in r due to obsB(s2) 6= obsB(s3).
With the network analogy mentioned above,
the last transition might model a communica-
tion from A to B.
Policies. A policy is a reflexive binary relation
7→ over a set of domains D. We require 7→ to
be reflexive because we assume that domains are aware of their own behaviour
at all times. We assume also that policies are transitive, to avoid additional com-
plexities associated with the semantics of intransitive policies. Transitive policies
arise naturally from lattices of security levels. The policy that has received the
most attention in the literature is over the set D = {H,L}, consisting of a do-
main H (or High), representing a high security domain whose activity needs to
be protected, and a domain L (or Low), representing a low security attacker who
aims to learn High secrets. We refer to this policy as H 67→ L; it is given by the
relation 7→= {(H,H), (L,L), (L,H)}.
If 7→ is a policy over some domain set D, we write u 7→ for the set { v ∈ D :
u 7→ v }, and 7→u for the set { v ∈ D : v 7→ u }. Similarly, the expression 67→u shall
denote the set { v ∈ D : v 67→ u }.
Further notational conventions for policies. Policies are depicted as directed
graphs and their vertices carry domain names. Edges due to reflexivity or tran-
sitivity are omitted.
Policy abstractions and cuts. A set of domains can be abstracted by grouping
its elements into sets. Such groupings can be motivated in a number of ways.
One is simply that we wish to take a coarser view of the system, and reduce
the number of domains by treating several domains as one. Groupings may also
arise from several domains deciding to collude in an attack on the security of
the system. Abstractions of a set of domains lead to associated abstractions of
policies and systems.
An abstraction of a set of domains D is a set D of subsets of D with D =⋃
F∈D F and F ∩ G 6= ∅ implies F = G for all F,G ∈ D. Associated with each
abstraction D of D is a function fD : D → D defined by taking fD(u) to be the
unique F ∈ D with u ∈ F . For a policy 7→ over D we let 7→D be the policy over
D defined by F 7→D G if and only if there are x ∈ F and x′ ∈ G with x 7→ x′.
In order to formalize the idea of a reduction to H 67→ L, we use abstractions
that group all domains into two sets that correspond to the High and Low
domains. A cut of a set of domains D with respect to a policy 7→ is a tuple
C = (H,L) such that {H,L} is an abstraction of D and there does not exist
u ∈ H and v ∈ L with u 7→ v. When forming policies, we identify cuts with
their underlying abstractions, and write 7→C for 7→{H,L}, so the last requirement
can also be formulated as H 67→C L. We mainly deal with abstractions that are
given by cuts in this paper. See Figure 3 for an illustration of how policy (b) in
Figure 1 is abstracted using C := (H,L) = ({S1, S2,TS}, {U,C1, C2}), where we
get L 7→C H due to C1 7→ S1 or C2 7→ S2 and H 67→C L as required for a cut.
U
C1
C2
S1
S2
TS
L
H
Fig. 3. Illustration of a policy abstraction.
Systems and abstractions. Systems can be viewed from the perspective of an
abstraction. Intuitively, the actions of an abstract domain F are all the actions
of any of its subdomains u ∈ F . It observes the collection of all observations
made by the members of F and thus their observations are functions from F to
O. Let M = (S,A,O,D,∆, obs, dom, sI) be a system and D be an abstraction
of D. Then MD is the system (S,A,O′,D, ∆, obsD, domD, sI), where O
′ is the
union of OF for all F ∈ D, its set of domains is D, for a state s ∈ S, the
observation obsDF (s) is the function with domain F ∈ D that sends each x ∈ F
to obsx(s), and dom
D(a) = fD(dom(a)) for all a ∈ A. Intuitively, obs
D
F (s) records
the observations made in each domain in F at s. Again, if C = (H,L) is a cut
we write MC for M{H,L}.
Monotonicity with respect to restrictiveness. In [18] the notion of monotonicity
with respect to restrictiveness is discussed, which holds for a given notion of
security X if, for all systems M and policies 7→ over the domain set of M,
the following statement holds: if M is X-secure with respect to 7→ then M is
X-secure with respect to every policy 7→′ with 7→⊆7→′. If a notion of security
satisfies this property, we will say that it is monotonic. Intuitively, adding edges
to a policy reduces the set of information flow restrictions u 67→ v implied by the
policy, making the policy easier to satisfy, so one would expect every sensible
notion of security to be monotonic. However, we will show that some notions of
security obtained by a sensible construction based on cuts do not support this
intuition.
3 Basic Notions of Noninterference
In this section we recall two security definitions which have been proposed in
the literature for nondeterministic, asynchronous automaton-based models. We
use these as the basic definitions of security for H 67→ L in the reductions that
we study. For purposes of comparison, we state the definitions using the most
obvious pointwise generalization from the usual two-domain case to the general
multi-domain case.
For deterministic systems, we define an operator · : S×A → S by s · a = s′,
where s′ is the unique state such that (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆ is satisfied. This operator is
extended to action sequences by setting s · ε = s and s · (αa) = (s · α) · a. This
way action sequences ‘act’ on the system’s state set and s ·α is the state reached
by performing α from s.
First, we recall Goguen and Meseguer’s original notion of noninterference
from [19]. They introduced a function purge, which, for a given domain u, elim-
inates all actions that are supposed to be non-interfering with u. It can be
inductively defined as follows: let purgeu(ε) = ε and for all α ∈ A
∗ and a ∈ A,
let
purgeu(αa) =
{
purgeu(α) · a if dom(a) 7→ u
purgeu(α) otherwise.
Their idea is, with respect to a fixed domain u, to deem a system secure if all
action sequences that are equivalent under purgeu yield the same observations
for u.
Definition 1. We say that M is P-secure for 7→ if for all u ∈ D and α, β ∈ A∗
we have: if purgeu(α) = purgeu(β) then obsu(sI · α) = obsu(sI · β).
This statement can be understood as the requirement that observations made by
a domain may only depend on the behaviour by domains permitted to interfere
with it.
3.1 Nondeducibility on Inputs
Goguen and Meseguer’s definition of noninterference [19] was for deterministic
systems only. Historically, Sutherland [5] was the first to consider information
flow in nondeterministic systems. He presented a general scheme to instantiate
notions of Nondeducibility, i.e., epistemic definitions of absence of information
flows. The notion of Nondeducibility on Inputs is one instance of this general
scheme.
Let u, v ∈ D. We say that α ∈ Au
∗ and β ∈ Viewsv(M) are v compatible if
there is r ∈ Runs(M) with actu(r) = α and viewv(r) = β. We write u  I v if
there are α ∈ Au
∗ and β ∈ Viewsv(M) which are not v compatible. In that case
v gains information about u’s behaviour in the following sense: if β is observed by
v then v can deduce that u did not perform α. Nondeducibility u 6 I v therefore
says that v is unable to make any nontrivial deductions about u behaviour.
Applying this idea pointwise, we get the following definition of security:
Definition 2. A system is NDIpw-secure for a policy 7→ over domains D when
for all u, v ∈ D: if u 67→ v then u 6 I v.
In the case of the policy H 67→ L with just two domains, NDIpw is the notion
Nondeducibility on Inputs as it is usually defined. We denote it as just NDI in
this case. The definition above generalizes this notion in one possible way to the
multi-domain case. We discuss several others below.
3.2 Generalized Noninterference
The nondeducibility relation H 6 L states that L considers all sequences of
actions of H possible, but allows that L has some information about how these
actions, if any, are interleaved with L’s actions. See Figure 4 for a system that
is NDI-secure but can be argued to leak information about how H ’s actions are
interleaved into a run. The observations made by L are written near the state
names.
sI s1
s0
0 1
0
h, ℓ
ℓ
Fig. 4. System demonstrating a weakness
of NDI.
This system is NDI-secure because ev-
ery L view is compatible with every
possible sequence of h actions per-
formed by H . However, note that if
the view 0ℓ1 is observed by L then it
obtains the knowledge that it was the
very first domain to act. The stronger
notion of Generalized Noninterference
introduced by McCullough [17] says
that L does not have even this weaker
form of knowledge. The original formulation is for a two-domain policy and is
based on a model that uses sets of event sequences. We present a straightforward
multi-domain variant (that is similar to Mantel’s combination BSI+BSD [8]).
Definition 3. A systemM is GNpw-secure for 7→ if for all u, v ∈ D with u 67→ v,
the properties
– GN+(u, v): for all r ∈ Runs(M), for all α0, α1 ∈ A
∗ with act(r) = α0α1,
and all a ∈ Au with there is r′ ∈ Runs(M) with act(r′) = α0aα1 and
viewv(r
′) = viewv(r), and
– GN−(u, v): for all r ∈ Runs(M), all α0, α1 ∈ A
∗ and all a ∈ Au, with
act(r) = α0aα1, there is r
′ ∈ Runs(M) with act(r′) = α0α1 and viewv(r′) =
viewv(r).
are satisfied.
Intuitively, this definition says that actions of domains u with u 67→ v can be
arbitrarily inserted and deleted, without changing the set of possible views that
v can obtain. In the case of the two-domain policy H 67→ L, the notion GNpw
is equivalent to the definition of Generalized Noninterference given in [20], and
we denote this case by GN. Note that the system in Figure 4 is not GN-secure,
because performing h as first action in a run makes it impossible for L to observe
the view 0ℓ1.
In deterministic systems, for the two-domain policy H 67→ L, the notions
NDIpw and GNpw, and Goguen and Meseguer’s orginal notion of Noninterfer-
ence are known to be equivalent. Thus, both NDIpw and GNpw are reasonable
candidates for the generalization of Noninterference to nondeterministic systems.
4 Motivation for Abstraction
The definitions NDIpw and GNpw have generalized the corresponding definitions
NDI and GN usually given for the two-domain policy H 67→ L in a pointwise
fashion, stating in different ways that there should not be a flow of information
from domain u to domain v when u 67→ v. We now present some examples that
suggest that these pointwise definitions may be weaker than required in the case
of policies with more than two domains.
We first present an example which demonstrates that NDIpw-security is
flawed with respect to combined behaviour of multiple domains. (Interestingly,
this can already be shown in a deterministic system.)
sI s0 s1
L:
H1:
H2:
0
⊥
⊥
0
⊥
⊥
1
⊥
⊥
h1, h2 ℓ
ℓ h1, h2
L
H1
H2
Fig. 5. A system and policy showing a weakness of NDIpw.
Example 1. Consider the system and policy depicted in Figure 5. The domain
assignment is given by dom(l) = L, dom(h1) = H1 and dom(h2) = H2. We
have H1 67→ L and H2 67→ L and show that H1 6 I L and H2 6 I L hold. Let
α = h1
a for a ≥ 0 and β be an L view, then β must have the form 0(ℓ0)b(ℓ1)c,
where b, c ≥ 0. Consider the run r = sI(ℓsI)bh2s0(h1s0)a(ℓs1)c, which satisfies
viewL(r) = 0(ℓ0)
b(ℓ1)c = β and actH1(r) = h1
a, and thus α and β are L
compatible. Due to symmetry, we also get H2 6 I L with the same argument.
s0 ⊥⊥
s1s2s3s4
ℓ1ℓ2ℓ1ℓ2
0
⊥
⊥
0
1
⊥
⊥
1
s9s10s11s12
ℓ2ℓ1ℓ2ℓ1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
s′0
h
⊥
⊥
s5s6s7s8
ℓ1ℓ2ℓ1ℓ2
0
⊥
⊥
0
1
⊥
⊥
1
s13s14s15s16
ℓ2ℓ1ℓ2ℓ1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
H
L1
L2
The observations are
depicted in the form
obsL1 (·)
obsL2 (·)
and are near
the corresponding
state. H observes ⊥
in every state.
Fig. 6. System and policy illustrating a collusion attack.
The system therefore is NDIpw-secure for the policy. However, if L observes the
view 0ℓ1 then H1 or H2 must have performed h1 or h2, respectively. ⊓⊔
In the example, domain L cannot know which of H1 or H2 was active upon
observing the view 0ℓ1, but L can tell that at least one of them was active
nonetheless. It can be argued that this is a flow of information that is not per-
mitted by the depicted policy. The example would turn formally insecure if we
changed the policy to H 67→ L and set dom(h1) = dom(h2) = H . The problem
arises as soon as more than one domain must be noninterfering with L.
One way to address this weakness of NDIpw is to revise the definition so that
it deals with what a domain can learn about the actions of a set of domains
collectively, rather than about these domains individually. We may extend the
relation  I to sets of domains as follows: for X ⊆ D, X 6= ∅ and u ∈ D, write
X  I u if there are α ∈ AX
∗ and β ∈ Viewsu(M) such that no r ∈ Runs(M)
satisfies both actX(r) = α and viewu(r) = β. Applying this with the set X =
67→u
consisting of all domains that may not interfere with domain u, we obtain the
following setwise version of Nondeducibility on Inputs:
Definition 4. A system is NDIsw-secure for 7→ if for all u ∈ D, we have that
67→u 6 I u.
This gives a notion that is intermediate between the pointwise versions of
Generalized Noninterference and Nondeducibility on Inputs:
Proposition 1. GNpw is strictly contained in NDIsw, and NDIsw is strictly
contained in NDIpw. A system is NDIsw-secure for H 67→ L if and only if it is
NDIpw-secure for H 67→ L.
We remark that there is not a need to give a similar setwise definition of
Generalized Noninterference, because the definition of GNpw already allows the
set of actions in a run to be modified, without change to the view of u, by
arbitrary insertions and deletions of actions with domains v in 67→u, through a
sequence of applications of GN+(v, u) and GN−(v, u).
Despite NDIsw and GNpw being suitable for the multi-domain case and the
latter notion being quite strict, one can argue that neither of them can handle
collusion, where multiple domains join forces in order to attack the system as
a team. The system depicted in Figure 6, a variant of Example 3 and Figure 4
from [21], can be shown to satisfy GNpw-security, hence is secure in the strongest
sense introduced so far. However, if L1 and L2 collude, they can infer from the
parity of their observations that H performed h at the beginning of the run.
This motivates the introduction of stronger coalition-aware notions of security.
5 Reduction-based Notions of Noninterference for
Multi-domain Policies
The examples of the previous section indicate that in nondeterministic settings,
it is necessary to deal with groups of agents both on the side of the attackers and
the side of the domains being attacked. Policy cuts provide types of groupings
and enable a reduction to a basic notion of security for two-domain policies.
The question that then remains is what types of cut we should use, and which
basic notion of security. In this section, we define three types of cut and the
resulting notions of security when GN and NDI are taken to be the basic notion
of security.
Let D be a set of domains. For u ∈ D we define the following two special
cuts Hu(u) and Ld(u).
Hu(u) := (u 7→, D \ u 7→) and Ld(u) := (D \ 7→u, 7→u)
The term Hu(u) stands for the cut that forms a High-up coalition starting at
domain u, while Ld(u) stands for the cut that forms a Low-down coalition with
respect to u. Figure 7 depicts an example of each on the same policy.
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Fig. 7. Cuts Hu(C) and Ld(C) visualized.
Abstractions of type Hu(·) are suggested by Ryan (as discussed in the in-
troduction), while the type Ld(·) is what we referred to as its dual. As already
noted in the introduction, there are additional ‘cut’ abstractions that are neither
High-up nor Low-down. In a systematic way, we can now obtain new notions of
security based on cuts as follows.
Definition 5. Let M be a system with domain set D and 7→ be a policy over
D. For X ∈ {GN,NDI}, we say M is
– Cut X-secure (C-X-secure) for 7→, if MC is X-secure for 7→C for all cuts C
of D,
– High-up X-secure (H-X-secure) for 7→, if MHu(u) is X-secure for 7→Hu(u)
for all u ∈ D,
– Low-down X-secure (L-X-secure) for 7→, if MLd(u) is X-secure for 7→Ld(u)
for all u ∈ D.
There is a straightforward relationship between these notions of GN and their
NDI-counterparts.
Proposition 2. For all X ∈ {C,H,L}: the notion X-GN is strictly contained
in X-NDI.
This follows directly from Definition 5, the fact that GN implies NDI due to
Proposition 1, and that the system depicted in Figure 4 provides separation for
each case. Also, one would expect that reasonable extensions of GN and NDI
agree if applied to H 67→ L, and this is exactly what we find, since we can identify
singleton coalitions with their only member.
6 Main Result
We now state the main result of the paper. We have a set of definitions of
security that address the need to consider groupings of attackers and defenders
in multi-domain policies, based on two basic notions of security NDI and GN for
the two-domain case. We are now interested in understanding the relationships
between these definitions. Additionally, we are interested in understanding which
definitions satisfy the desirable property of monotonicity.
Theorem 1. The notions of GNpw, L-GN, H-GN, C-GN, NDIpw, NDIsw, L-NDI,
H-NDI and C-NDI-security are ordered by implication as depicted in Figure 8.
The containment relations are strict; arrows due to reflexivity or transitivity are
omitted. The name of a notion is underlined if and only if it is monotonic.
In particular, we find for the GN-variants that Ryan’s proposal to use reduc-
tions based on High-up coalitions is complete, in the sense that it yields the same
notion of security as a quantification over all cuts. This notion is moreover ad-
equate in the sense of being monotonic. Somewhat surprisingly, the dual notion
based on Low-down coalitions is strictly weaker, and also fails to be monotonic.
The situation is different for the basic notion of NDI. In this case, we see
that Ryan’s proposal is not complete with respect to quantification over all cuts.
Indeed, the resulting notion H-NDI does not even imply the more adequate
setwise version of of NDI, although it does imply the pointwise version. The
Low-down version of NDI does imply the setwise version, and is independent
of H-NDI. However, neither H-NDI nor L-NDI is monotonic. This leaves the
(monotonic) cut based variant as the most satisfactory notion in this case.
How one arrives at these results is explained in the next section, which gives
proofs for all results in this paper.
H-GN C-GN
L-GN
GNpw
= C-NDI
L-NDI
NDIsw
NDIpw
H-NDI
Fig. 8. Implications between our notions of security.
7 Technical Details
7.1 Relationship between GNpw and NDIsw
Proof (of Proposition 1). GNpw is strictly contained in NDIsw: For containment,
assume a system to be GNpw-secure for a policy 7→, let u be a domain and X be a
set of domains inM, where x 67→ u for all x ∈ X . Then the conditions GN+(x, u)
and GN−(x, u) guarantee that at any position in the run, any action from AX
can be inserted or removed ‘without changing the u view of the run’. More
precisely, one always finds a run with the same u view and the desired action
inserted or removed at any position. Therefore, all u views are compatible with
all sequences from AX
∗ and the system is NDIpw-secure for 7→. Separation is
due to the system depicted in Figure 4 and the fact that NDIsw and NDI are
equivalent on H 67→ L.
NDIsw is strictly contained in NDIpw: Containment is clear, since NDIpw-
security is NDI-security restricted to the case of singletons and thus follows
directly from NDI.
The system in Example 1 separates NDIsw and NDIpw. For NDIpw, it suffices
to test if H1 6 I L because of symmetry. We have H1 6 I L because by visiting
s0 an appropriate number of times we can add any number of h1 actions to a
run without changing its L view. As already seen, this system is not NDI-secure;
if L observes the view 0ℓ1 the action sequence ε ∈ {h1, h2}∗ wasn’t performed
by {H1, H2}. ⊓⊔
7.2 Relationships between Cut-based Notions of GN
A GN vulnerability of a system M is a tuple (u, α0, a, α1, β, 7→), where 7→ is
a policy over the domain set of M, u is a domain in M, α0, α1 ∈ A∗, a ∈ A
with dom(a) 67→ u and β ∈ Viewsu(M) such that there is a run r that satisfies
viewu(r) = β and at least one of
– act(r) = α0α1 and no run r
′ with act(r′) = α0aα1 satisfies viewu(r
′) = β,
– act(r) = α0aα1 and no run r
′ with act(r′) = α0α1 satisfies viewu(r
′) = β.
If the context is clear, we only say vulnerability. We evidently have a vulner-
ability of a system if and only if GN+(dom(a), u) or GN−(dom(a), u) does not
hold. Without loss of generality we always assume a violation of GN+(dom(a), u)
if there is a vulnerability, since the case of a GN−(dom(a), u) violation is similar.
The proofs to compare the different cut-based variants of GN are done by
contraposition and show how, for given cuts C0 and C1, a vulnerability of MC1
can be translated into a vulnerability ofMC0 . The next definition formalizes the
idea that the view of an attacking coalition, e.g. the Low domain of a cut, has
at least as much information as the view of a sub-coalition. We will need this to
argue that if a coalition possesses enough information to successfully launch an
attack on a system (i.e. it can violate GN+) then, a fortiori, a bigger coalition
possesses enough information for an attack.
Definition 6. Let M be a system with action set A and observation set O, let
D0 and D1 be abstractions of its domain set, and F ∈ D0, G ∈ D1 such that
F ⊆ G. Then the operator
prGF : A ∪O
G ∪ ViewsG(M
D1)→ ViewsF (M
D0)
is defined as follows:
– if a ∈ A then prGF (a) = a|F , where a is considered to be a sequence of length
one. The result is its subsequence of actions that F can perform, i.e. it is
either a or ε,
– if o ∈ OG then prGF (o) = o|F , that is observations made by G are restricted
such that the result is the observation made by F ,
– if α is a G view and β ∈ OG ∪ AG · OG such that αβ is a G view, then
prGF (αβ) = pr
G
F (α) ◦ˆ pr
G
F (β).
For all other cases let the result be undefined. The symbol prGF (·) is chosen to
support the intuition that G views are ‘projected down’ to F views.
That the previous definition is reasonable is established by a correctness
lemma which makes the restriction aspect of the operator clear.
Lemma 1. Let M be a system, let D0 and D1 be abstractions of its domain set,
and F ∈ D0, G ∈ D1 such that F ⊆ G. Then for all r ∈ Runs(M) we have
prGF (viewG(r)) = viewF (r).
Proof. First, we confine ourselves to case of observations. Let o ∈ OG such that
obsC1G (s) = o for some state s, then o is a function that maps each u ∈ G to an
element in O. The function prGF (o) = o|F×O has the domain set F , and is total
since o is total and we have F ⊆ G. We get that prGF (o) is the observation of
domain F made in state s and is thus equal to obsC0F (s).
The main result is shown by induction over runs. The base case follows from
the previous paragraph. For the induction step, let r be a run of the form r′as,
where r ∈ Runs(M), a is an action and s a state of M. We distinguish two
cases.
If domC1(a) 6= G then we have viewG(ras
′) = viewG(r) ◦ˆ obs
C1
G (s
′) and
prGF (viewG(r) ◦ˆ obs
C1
G (s
′)) = prGF (viewG(r)) ◦ˆ pr
G
F (obs
C0
G (s
′)), and this is equal
to viewF (r) ◦ˆ obs
C0
F (s
′) by induction and the special case of observations above.
This value equals viewF (ras
′) by definition of view. Note that we must have
domC0(a) 6= F , for if we had domC0(a) = F then dom(a) ∈ F , which implies
dom(a) ∈ G and yields domC1(a) = G, contrary to the case assumption.
If domC1(a) = G then viewG(ras
′) = viewG(r) · a · obs
C1
G (s
′). Applying prGF
and induction yields prGF (viewG(ras
′)) = viewF (r) ◦ˆ pr
G
F (a) ◦ˆ obs
C0
F (s
′), which is
equal to viewF (ras
′) in both cases domC0(a) = F and domC0(a) 6= F . ⊓⊔
Conditions under which the translation of a vulnerability is possible are es-
tablished by the following result: the attacking coalition may not shrink and the
translation must respect the status of being the attacker’s victim.
Lemma 2. Let M be a system and 7→ be a policy, and C0 = (H0,L0) be a
cut of the domain set of M with respect to 7→. Let (F, α0, a, α1, β, 7→C0) be a
vulnerability of MC0 . Let C1 = (H1,L1) be a cut such that there is G ∈ {H1,L1}
with domC1(a) 67→C1 G and F ⊆ G. Then there is β′ ∈ ViewsG(MC1) such that a
vulnerability of MC1 is given by (G,α0, a, α1, β′, 7→C1).
Proof. Since (F, α0, a, α1, β, 7→C0) is a vulnerability of MC0 , there is a run r on
α0α1 and an F view of β such that no run on α0aα1 attains the F view β. Due
to the prerequisites it suffices to show that there is a G view β′ attained by
some run on α0α1 such that no run on α0aα1 can attain a G view of β
′, be-
cause then (G,α0, a, α1, β
′, 7→C1) is a vulnerability of MC1 , due to a violation of
GN+(domC1(a), G), and we are finished. By vulnerability, there is a run on α0α1
with F view of β; let β′ be G view of that run. If there were a run r on α0aα1
with viewG(r) = β
′ then this run would satisfy viewF (r) = pr
G
F (viewG(r)) =
prGF (β
′) = β by the same lemma, which contradicts the existence of the vulnera-
bility ofMC0 . Therefore, no such run can exist and we have found a vulnerability
of MC1 as claimed. ⊓⊔
Some relationships between cut-based variants of GN are trivial and can be
seen directly.
Proposition 3. C-GN implies both H-GN and L-GN.
That High-up GN implies Cut GN, and therefore these notions are equivalent,
might not be apparent, but can be explained by the fact that the Low component
L of a cut is the intersection of the Low components L0, ...,Ln−1 of n High-up
cuts and thus can obtain no more information about High behaviour than each
Li individually. If we can prevent each Li from obtaining any information about
how High actions are interleaved into runs then the same must apply to L as
well.
Theorem 2. The notions C-GN and H-GN are equivalent.
Proof. Because of Proposition 3 it suffices to show that H-GN implies C-GN.
The proof is done by contraposition and translates a vulnerability with respect
to an arbitrary cut into a vulnerability with respect to a Hu(·)-style cut.
Let M be a system with domain set D, 7→ a policy over D and C0 a cut
of D. Furthermore, let (F, α0, a, α1, β, 7→C0) be a GN vulnerability of MC0 . Set
C1 := Hu(dom(a)), H := dom(a)7→ and L := D \ dom(a)7→. Then we have
C1 = (H,L). We show that the prerequisites for Lemma 2 are satisfied, which
gives us a vulnerability of MC1 .
First, we demonstrate that domC1(a)=H 67→C1 L. Let u ∈ H and v ∈ L, we
must show that u 67→ v. Assume u 7→ v, then by choice of C1 we have dom(a) 7→ u,
which implies dom(a) 7→ u 7→ v and dom(a) 7→ v by transitivity. Therefore
v ∈ H, which contradicts v ∈ L, and hence we have u 67→ v. It remains to prove
that F ⊆ L. Let u ∈ F , then due to vulnerability we have domC0(a) 67→C0 F , i.e.
dom(a) 67→ u. By choice of C1 we get u 6∈ H, which is equivalent to u ∈ L. Now
application of Lemma 2 yields a vulnerability of MC1 . ⊓⊔
The result obtained by Theorem 2 shows completeness of Ryan’s technique
for GN. From this follows that the High-up variant of GN implies the Low-
down variant. There is also an example that demonstrates that these notions are
distinct, and thus the High-up variant is stricter.
Theorem 3. H-GN is strictly contained in L-GN.
Proof. Containment follows from the facts that H-GN = C-GN by Theorem 2
and the trivial implications from Proposition 3. For separation, we recall Figure
6, and modify it slightly to suit our needs. This system can be verified to be GN-
secure for the separation policy (i.e., the identity relation) on {H,L1, L2}; add
the edges (L1, H) and (L2, H) to it and call it 7→. We anticipate the result that
GNpw is monotonic (see Proposition 7), and get that the system is GNpw-secure
for 7→.
With respect to 7→, the domain set has two Low-down cuts, which are Ld(L1)
and Ld(L2). The systems MLd(L1) and MLd(L2) can be shown to be GN-secure
for 7→Ld(L1) and 7→Ld(L2), respectively, and therefore M is L-GN-secure for 7→.
However, for the High-up cut Hu(H), one can see that MHu(H) fails to be GN-
secure for 7→Hu(H). Consider the run r := s0hs′0ℓ1s5ℓ2s13. We have viewL(r) =
⊥
⊥ℓ1
0
⊥ℓ2
0
1 , where L observations are written in the form
obsL1(·)
obsL2(·)
. By the parity
of their final observations after performing r, domains L1 and L2 together can
determine that H performed h at the very beginning of the run. Thus, MHu(H)
doesn’t satisfy the property GN−({H}, {L1, L2}) for 7→Hu(H), which means that
M is not H-GN-secure for 7→. ⊓⊔
The weakness of Low-down GN is that it assumes a somewhat restricted
attacker that never groups domains into Low that may not interfere with each
other according to the policy. (For example, for the policy in Figure 6, the
coalition {L1, L2} is not covered.) But nevertheless such coalitions are possible,
which provides an argument against Low-down GN if coalitions are a risk. In
a later subsection about monotonicity, we will show that Low-down GN is not
monotonic, which one can interpret as further evidence that it might seem prob-
lematic. However, Low-down GN doesn’t break all our intuitions; as one might
expect, it turns out to be stricter than GNpw.
Theorem 4. L-GN is strictly contained in GNpw.
Proof. Containment is shown by contraposition. LetM be a system with domain
set D and 7→ a policy over D. Assume that M is not GNpw-secure for 7→ and
has a vulnerability (u, α0, a, α1, β, 7→).
Set C := Ld(u), L := 7→u and H := D \ 7→u. We show, using Lemma 1,
that there is β′ so that (L, α0, a, α1, β′, 7→C) is a vulnerability in MC . First, we
have domC(a) = H, due to dom(a) 67→ u, which implies domC(a) 67→C L. Next,
we demonstrate existence of a suitable β′. We identify observations made by v
with observations made by the singleton coalition {v}, and consider the trivial
abstraction of D, which is { {w} : w ∈ D }. Then we clearly have {v} ⊆ L and
can apply Lemma 1. Due to vulnerability, there is a run on α0α1 which has a
{u} view of β such that no run on α0aα1 has a {u} view of β. Let β′ be the
L view of this run. If there were a run r on α0aα1 with L view of β′, then
viewu(r) = pr
L
{u}(viewL(r)) = pr
L
{u}(β
′) = β by identification of u and {u} and
Lemma 1, contradicting the violation of GN+(u, v) in M. Therefore, no such
run can exist and (L, α0, a, α1, β′, 7→C) is a vulnerability of MC .
For separation, take the example from Theorem 3 and add the additional
edge (L1, L2) to 7→. The system is still GNpw-secure for 7→ due to Proposition
7, but since we have {H} 67→Ld(L2) {L1, L2}, the system M
Ld(L2) is not GN-
secure by the argument in the proof of Theorem 3. ⊓⊔
This concludes our study of cuts in the context of GN.
7.3 Relationships between Cut-based Notions of NDI
In this subsection, an NDI vulnerability of a system M is a tuple (u, α, β, 7→),
where 7→ is a policy over the domain set ofM, u is a domain inM, dom(a) 67→ u
for all actions a that occur in α, and there is no run r of M with act67→u(r) = α
and viewu(r) = β. If the context is clear, we only say vulnerability. Clearly, a
system is NDIsw-secure if and only if it has no vulnerabilities.
We will follow the same strategy as used in the previous subsection, and first
provide a lemma to translate vulnerabilities, then give proofs for the relationships
claimed in Theorem 1.
In order to translate vulnerabilities from one cut to another, we again must
make sure that the attacking coalition doesn’t shrink. Additionally, since NDIsw
deals with combined behaviour, the translation must make sure that some non-
interference constraints, which are pairs (u, v) such that u 67→ v, are preserved.
Lemma 3. Let M be a system, 7→ a policy over its domain set, C0 = (H0,L0)
be a cut of its domain set, and F ∈ {H0,L0} such that (F, α, β, 7→C0 ) is a
vulnerability of MC0 . Let C1 = (H1,L1) be a cut such that there is G ∈ {H1,L1}
with
1. for all actions a that occur in α, we have domC1(a) 67→C1 G, and
2. F ⊆ G.
Then there is β′ ∈ ViewsG(MC1) so that (G,α, β′, 7→C1) is a vulnerability of
MC1 .
Proof. Due to the prerequisites, it only remains to show the existence of a suit-
able β′. Let β′ be a G view with prGF (β
′) = β. Set F := 67→0F and G := 67→1G.
Prerequisite 1 gives us α ∈ AG
∗. If there were a run r of MC1 with actG(r) = α
and viewG(r) = β
′, then the same run would satisfy actF (r) = α, since by
vulnerability α consists of actions by domains in F only, and because we have
viewF (r) = pr
G
F (viewG(r)) = pr
G
F (β
′) = β by Lemma 1, which contradicts the
vulnerability of MC1 . Therefore, no such run can exist and (G,α, β′, 7→C1) is a
vulnerability in MC1 . ⊓⊔
Just as with GN, some relationships are trivial and can be seen from Defini-
tion 5 right away.
Proposition 4. The notion C-NDI implies H-NDI and L-NDI.
Contrary to GN, however, where High-up GN is strictly contained in Low-
down GN, we have instead the somewhat surprising situation that the corre-
sponding variants of NDI are incomparable. The next theorem provides the nec-
essary examples.
Theorem 5. The notions L-NDI and H-NDI are incomparable with respect to
implication.
Proof. H-NDI does not imply L-NDI: Consider the system and policy in Example
1. In the proof of Proposition 1 it is shown that the system violates NDIsw-
security with respect to the cut Ld(L), which groups H1 and H2 together. It is
therefore not L-NDI-secure. However, it is H-NDI-secure for the depicted policy.
To show this, it is enough to prove NDI-security of the system with respect to
Hu(H1), because the case Hu(H2) is symmetrical to it.
Set C := Hu(H1), H := {H1} and L := {H2, L} \H . Then C = (H,L) and
H 67→C L. Let α ∈ {h1}∗ and β be an L view. Then α has the form h1
k for k ≥ 0
and β is an element of the language described by one of the regular expressions
0
⊥ (ℓ
0
⊥ )
n(h2
0
⊥ )
m for n,m ≥ 0, or 0⊥ (ℓ
0
⊥)
n(h2
0
⊥ )
mℓ 1⊥ ((l+h2)
1
⊥ )
k for n ≥ 0,m ≥ 1
and k ≥ 0, where L observations are noted as obsL(·)
obsH2(·)
. It is clear that there is a
run that demonstrates the compatibility of α and β: the state s1 can be visited
k times for performing α. We therefore have H 6 I L and conclude that the
system is H-NDI-secure.
L-NDI does not imply H-NDI: Consider the system in Figure 6. To prove
it L-NDI-secure, it suffices to do so for the cut C := Ld(L1), because the case
of the only other Ld(·) cut is symmetric to it. Views perceived by {L1} (here,
we identify {L1} with L1) have the form 0(ℓ10)n or 0(ℓ11)n for n ≥ 0. All these
views are {L1} compatible with all α ∈ {l2, h}∗, because they can be attained by
the system performing l1 only, or α can be added to a run by looping at states
s0, s1, s3, s9 or s11. The system is therefore L-NDI-secure.
However, it is not H-NDI-secure; take the cut Hu(H), set H := {H} and
L := {L1, L2}, and consider the action sequence ε performed by domain H. The
L view β := ⊥⊥ℓ1
0
⊥ℓ2
0
⊥ can only be attained if the first action performed in the
system is h. Therefore ε and β are not compatible and we have H I L. ⊓⊔
These results show that Ryan’s technique is not ‘complete’ for Nondeducibil-
ity on Inputs, as High-up NDI and Low-down NDI are incomparable. The ques-
tion if High-up NDI is complete can now be answered, because if High-up NDI
implied Cut NDI, then High-up NDI would also imply Low-down NDI due to
Proposition 4, which would contradict the result from Theorem 5. With sym-
metry, the same argument holds for High-up NDI and Low-down NDI swapped,
and we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. C-NDI is strictly contained in both H-NDI and L-NDI.
The previous theorem alone doesn’t yield evidence in favor of High-up or Low-
down. As with GN, one might expect the High-up variant to be more adequate,
but it turns out that this isn’t the case. We can argue against High-up using
the system presented in Example 1. As shown in the proof of Theorem 5, it is
High-up NDI- but not Low-down NDI-secure due to the cut Ld(L) introducing
a vulnerability. The cut Ld(L) aggregates the domains into {L} and 67→L =
{H1, H2}. But if L can infer from observing a certain view that the domains in
67→L did not perform some action sequence, this means that the system is not
NDIsw-secure. In other words, NDIsw and Low-down NDI are equivalent notions
on the example.
Corollary 2. H-NDI does not imply NDIsw.
The weakness of High-up NDI is, similar to Low-down GN, that it doesn’t
group domains into High that are incomparable in the policy, while NDI does.
The definition of NDI is a natural extension of the pointwise application of two-
level Nondeducibility on Inputs, so there is an argument that High-up is not
adequate in the setting of NDI. The case against it can be made even stronger
by proving that Low-down NDI does not have this undesirable property. which
is what the next result accomplishes.
Theorem 6. L-NDI implies NDIsw.
Proof. Let M be a system with domain set D and 7→ be a policy over D.
Assume M is not NDIsw-secure for 7→, then there are u ∈ D, α ∈ A67→u
∗ and
β ∈ Viewsu(M) so that (u, α, β, 7→) is a vulnerability of M. Clearly, for the
abstraction D given by { {v} : v ∈ D } the system MD has the vulnerability
({u}, α, β, 7→D).
Consider the cut C := Ld(u), we use Lemma 3 to show that there is a
vulnerability ofMC . Set L := 7→u and H := D\ 7→u. We obviously have {u} ⊆ L,
so it only remains to show that α consists only of actions performed by domains
that may not interfere with L with respect to 7→C . Let a be an action that
occurs in α. Since dom(a) 67→ u by vulnerability in MD we get that dom(a) 6∈ L
by choice of C, which means dom(a) ∈ H, and this implies domC(a) = H and
therefore domC(a) 67→C L.
Application of Lemma 3 now gives us a vulnerability of MC , which means
that M is not L-NDI-secure for 7→. ⊓⊔
For the last relationship, the notion High-up NDI is compared with NDIpw.
Recall that NDIpw doesn’t properly deal with combined behaviour, but this is
what one would expect from a sensible Nondeducibility notion for multi-domain
policies. The statement made by the next proposition therefore shouldn’t be
interpreted as redeeming.
Proposition 5. H-NDI implies NDIpw.
Proof. Let M be a system with domain set D and 7→ a policy over D. Assume
that M is not NDIpw-secure for 7→, then there are u, v ∈ D with u 67→ v and
u  I v. We can proceed as in the proof of Theorem 6: the system MD has
a vulnerability ({v}, α, β, 7→D), where D := { {w} : w ∈ D }, and choosing
C := Hu(u) yields a vulnerability of MC via Lemma 3.
(An important point here is that α consists of actions by a single domain
only, whereas in the proof of Theorem 6 the sequence α can contain actions by
multiple domains. If only a single domain u is acting, a High-up cut can capture
u in its abstracted High domain; in the case of multiple active domains it might
not, see Example 1.) ⊓⊔
7.4 Relationships between the GN and NDI Variants
Proposition 6. The notion GNpw doesn’t imply any of H-NDI, L-NDI or C-NDI.
The notion L-GN does not imply H-NDI or C-NDI.
Proof. The system depicted in Figure 6 is GNpw- but not H-GN-secure as argued
in the proof of Theorem 3 for the corresponding policy and therefore not H-NDI-
secure (since H-GN implies H-NDI). As a trivial consequence, we get that GNpw
doesn’t imply C-NDI. Also, we have that L-GN doesn’t imply H-NDI, since
otherwise H-NDI implied L-GN and, since L-GN implies L-NDI, also L-NDI,
contradicting Theorem 5. As a consequence, we find that L-GN doesn’t imply
C-NDI.
To see that GNpw doesn’t imply L-NDI, add the edge (L1, L2) to the policy
considered in the previous paragraph, and consider the cut Ld(L2), which is
given by ({H}, {L1, L2}) and is the same cut used in the proof of Theorem
3 to demonstrate a violation of H-NDI-security. Therefore, the system is not
L-NDI-secure either.
⊓⊔
If all results from this subsection are combined, we obtain exactly the con-
tainment diagram as claimed by Theorem 1.
7.5 Monotonicity
The statement u 67→ v can be understood as a noninterference constraint and
adding the edge u 7→ v removes this constraint from a policy. If a system is
secure (for a sensible definition of ‘secure’) and constraints are discarded from the
policy, it seems reasonable to expect that security is preserved. In this subsection
we investigate which of our notions support this intuition.
We have to compare cuts of the same domain set but with respect to different
policies, which is why we make explicit which policy a cut refers to by writing,
for example, Hu 7→(·).
If not mentioned otherwise, all systems in this subsection refer to their set
of domains as D, and we have two policies 7→0 and 7→1 with 7→0⊆7→1.
Theorem 7. The notions GN, H-GN and C-GN are monotonic.
Proof. GN is monotonic: Let (u, α0, a, α1, β, 7→1) be a GN-vulnerability of some
system M, then dom(a) 67→1 u, which implies dom(a) 67→0 u since 67→1⊆67→0.
Because domain assignments and u views are not affected by the policy, we have
that (u, α0, a, α1, β, 7→0) is a GN vulnerability of M.
H-GN and C-GN are monotonic: Since H-GN and C-GN are equivalent by
Theorem 2, it suffices to prove it for H-GN only.
Set C1 := Hu
7→1(dom(a)), H1 := dom(a)7→1 and L1 := D \dom(a)7→1 . LetM
be a system such that (L1, α0, a, α1, β, 7→1) is a GN vulnerability ofMC . Then we
have H1 67→
C1
1 L1. Furthermore, set C0 := Hu
7→0(dom(a)), H0 := dom(a)7→0 , and
L0 := D \ dom(a)
7→0 . This implies H0 67→
C0
0 L0. We show that (L0, α0, a, α1, 7→0)
is a GN vulnerability of MC0 by demonstrating that we have L1 ⊆ L0 and
domC0(a) 67→C00 L0, and then applying Lemma 2.
For the former, let u ∈ L1. Then dom(a) 67→1 u which implies dom(a) 67→0 u,
and this gives us u ∈ L0. For the latter, by choice of C0 we clearly have that
dom(a) ∈ H0 and therefore dom
C0(a) = H0, which implies dom
C0(a) 67→C00 L0.
Lemma 2 now gives us the existence of a GN vulnerability of MC0 . ⊓⊔
That High-up GN is monotonic can be explained with the fact that adding edges
can never grow the Low component in a given High-up cut. Since according to
the definition, High is taken to be u 7→ for a given domain u, adding an edge
might grow High, which in turn would shrink Low. So adding edges can never
increase the knowledge of the Low coalition when High-up cuts are used.
The case is different for Low-down GN. Adding edges to a policy can join
two formerly incomparable elements which then become members of Low in a
Low-down coalition. The reason is the definition of the Low component, which
for a given domain u is taken to be 7→u, or in other words, Low will be all
domains from which u is permitted to learn. Protection due to Low-down cuts
thus requires a somewhat friendly attacker, so there is an argument that this
can be considered a flaw in the definition itself.
Proposition 7. L-GN is not monotonic.
Proof. As shown in the proof of Theorem 3, the system depicted in Figure 6
is L-GN-secure. The proof of Theorem 4 demonstrates that adding the edge
(L1, L2) to the policy turns it non-L-GN-secure. ⊓⊔
This concludes the investigation of monotonicity for our variants of GN. But
there are two more things to note about adding edges to a policy when GN is
used: (1) The attack surface does not increase, since already generic GN requires
all domains to be unable to infer the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any secret
events. In fact, it might even get smaller. (2) Adding edges can decrease the
number of cuts, so there might be fewer requirements on the system in order
to be secure. For Cut GN, the results from Theorem 7 suggests that a smaller
number of cuts can compensate for a possible increase of Low’s knowledge.
The argument for Cut NDI being monotonic is similar to the case of High-up
and Cut GN. That NDI and NDIpw are monotonic is straightforward.
Proposition 8. The notions NDIpw, NDI and C-NDI are monotonic.
Proof. NDIpw is monotonic: Let M be NDIpw-secure for 7→0 and u, v ∈ D such
that u  I v. Then u 7→0 v by NDIpw-security of M for 7→0 and u 7→1 v by
7→0⊆7→1. Therefore, M is NDIpw-secure for 7→1.
C-NDI is monotonic: LetM be a system and C = (H,L) be a cut of D, then
we have H 67→C1 L. Assume M
C has an NDI vulnerability (L, α, β, 7→1). We show
that (L, α, β, 7→0) is a vulnerability of that system, too.
First, let u ∈ H and v ∈ L. Then we have u 67→1 v, which implies u 67→0 v.
Therefore H 67→C0 L and C is a valid cut with respect to 7→0. This also gives
us domC(a) 67→C0 L for all actions a that occur in α, because we must have
domC(a) = H by vulnerability.
Finally, clearly β remains a valid L view and trivially we have L ⊆ L. There-
fore, due to Lemma 3, we get that (L, α, β, 7→0) is an NDI vulnerability of MC .
NDI is monotonic: Let M be a system that is NDI-secure for 7→0, u ∈ D,
X0 :=
67→0u, X1 :=
67→1u, α ∈ AX1
∗ and β ∈ Viewsu(M). Then, because of
67→1⊆67→0, we have X1 ⊆ X0, which implies α ∈ AX0
∗. With NDI-security of M
for 7→0 we get that α and β are compatible, and therefore M is NDI-secure for
7→1 as well. ⊓⊔
Merging two incomparable domains into a Low-down cut is also possible for
NDI, and here we too obtain the result that the Low-down variant fails to be
monotonic. In fact, the same system as in the case of Low-down GN can be used.
However, the notion High-up NDI does not share the monotonicity property
with its GN counterpart. While it’s true that Low might shrink if edges are added
and thus has less knowledge at hand for an attack, and that the new policy might
have fewer cuts, the set of action sequences that have to be compatible with any
Low view grows, which increases the attack surface (i.e., Low might now be able
to exclude certain High behaviours). The next result suggests that this increase
can outweigh the loss of knowledge experienced by Low and the fewer number
of cuts combined.
Theorem 8. The notions L-NDI and H-NDI are not monotonic.
Proof. L-NDI is not monotonic: In the proof of Theorem 5 it is shown that the
the system in Figure 6 is L-NDI-secure for the depicted policy, which we call 7→0,
given by L1 7→0 H and L2 7→0 H (excluding edges due to reflexivity). Let 7→1
be the policy obtained by taking 7→0 and adding the additional edge L1 7→1 L2.
Then the system is not L-NDI-secure for 7→1: consider the cut Ld
7→1(L2). It is
equivalent to Hu7→0(H). In the proof of Theorem 5, it is demonstrated that the
system is not NDI-secure for 7→
Hu(H)
0 . But since Hu(H) and Ld(L2) are equal,
we get that it isn’t NDI-secure for 7→
Ld(L2)
1 either.
H-NDI is not monotonic: Consider the system M in Example 1 and call the
depicted policy 7→0, which is given by L 7→0 H1 and L 7→0 H2, excluding edges
due to reflexivity. Let 7→1 be the policy 7→0 with the additional edge H1 7→1 H2.
The system is H-NDI-secure for 7→0 due to Theorem 5, but it is not H-NDI-secure
for 7→1. To see this, take the cut Hu
7→1(H1), which is equivalent to Ld
7→0(L).
And as argued in the proof of Proposition 1, the system MLd
7→0(L) has an NDI
vulnerability, and thus M is not H-NDI-secure for 7→1. ⊓⊔
Since NDI is monotonic, it cannot be equal to Low-down NDI, and there-
fore this containment must be strict. With the same argument we get strict
containment of High-up NDI in pointwise NDI.
Corollary 3. L-NDI is strictly contained in NDI, and H-NDI is strictly con-
tained in NDIpw.
Together with the results on containment relationships obtained in the pre-
vious subsections, our results on monotonicity now yield proofs for Theorem
1.
8 Conclusion
In this work we have discussed several variants of Generalized Noninterference
and Nondeducibility on Inputs for multi-domain policies that use reductions
to the two-level case, including a technique proposed by Ryan. We have found
that this technique leads to a stricter notion in the case of Generalized Non-
interference, but behaves counter-intuitively in the case of Nondeducibility on
Inputs, where it yields a notion that is incomparable to a natural variant for
multi-domain policies. We have found evidence that seems to suggest that con-
sidering all cuts is a more robust choice as a reduction technique. Some notions
we obtained break our intuitions in the sense that they are not preserved under
removing noninterference constraints.
These results have left open a question about how to handle the general case
of collusion, as reductions to H 67→ L are a special case of collusion where two
coalitions are operating, while general abstractions can model an arbitrary num-
ber of coalitions. It seems natural to extend the theory such that it can handle
general abstractions, but then we leave the area of transitive noninterference. For
example, consider the transitive policy 7→ that contains the relations A 7→ B and
C 7→ D only, and the abstraction D that forms the coalitions {A}, {B,C} and
{D}. The resulting policy 7→D is intransitive, as it has edges {A} 7→D {B,C}
and {B,C} 7→D {D}, but lacks the edge {A} 7→D {D}. In this case, it seems
reasonable to say that information may get from A to D, as domains B and
C collude and share their observations, but it needs intermediate behaviour by
them in order to forward the information. Adding the edge {A} 7→D {D} clashes
with this reasoning, as it would express that A may directly communicate with
D. This suggests that dealing with general abstractions requires techniques from
the theory of intransitive noninterference. Semantics for intransitive noninterfer-
ence that build in types of collusion have been considered in a few works [22,21],
but the relationship of these definitions to abstractions remains to be studied.
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